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ABSTRACT 
Heterogeneity or the presence of a variety of decision rules 
in a population has usually been ignored in voting research. A method 
for handling heterogeneous preferences using rank order data is 
developed and applied to a simple issue-voting model. The estimated 
average effect of partisanship is substantially higher when the 
assumption of homogeneity is relaxed, though many self-identified 
partisans also use ideological criteria to evaluate candidates and 
many independents rely on partisan criteria. 
HETEROGENEITY IN MODELS OF ELECTORAL CHOICE* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Douglas Rivers 
California Institute of Technology 
Understanding why voters prefer one candidate over another has 
been a fundamental concern of voting research. Various models of 
individual decision making have been proposed and tested using 
aggregate and survey data on public opinion and voting behavior. Most 
of these tests have involved predicting vote choice, candidate 
preference, or satisfaction with incumbent performance on the basis of 
voter characteristics (demographic variables, policy preferences, 
party identification, etc. ) or candidate characteristics (party, issue 
positions, performance variables) or some combination of these. The 
best predictors of vote (or some similar variable) are identified as 
"important" and the remaining variables are usually discarded as 
potential explanatory factors of voting behavior. 
While such procedures might be justified if one's goal was to 
explain election outcomes, they turn out to be unsatisfactory if one's 
goal is to characterize voter decision processes. Their shortcoming 
stems from the fact that taste variations are allowed to influence 
vote or candidate preference only in a very restrictive way. For 
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example, two voters may prefer different candidates because the voters 
have different policy preferences, but not because they possess 
different decision rules. In fact, if two voters have identical 
policy preferences and demographic characteristics, then any of the 
standard methods of analyzing voting behavior would predict that the 
two would cast identical votes. Yet it is easy to think of situations 
where such a prediction would be unwarranted. If issues have 
different levels of salience to voters, then identical policy 
preferences do not necessarily imply identical (or even similar) 
voting patterns for voters. 
The assumption that voters share the same decision rule except 
for some measured attributes such as policy preferences, occupation, 
and social characteristics is common in voting research. Its 
violation, which will be called heterogeneity, is the topic of this 
paper. Some research areas where it is plausiple to expect 
heterogeneity may serve to illustrate the concept: 
Retrospective and Sociotropic Voting (Fiorina, 1981; Kinder and 
Kiewiet, 1978) . Are voters self-interested or sociotropic? Do they 
vote more on the basis of prospective or retrospective considerations? 
These questions are probably ill-posed since some voters may be more 
self-interested or more retrospective than others and any universal 
generalizations would be inappropriate. 
Economic Influences on Voting (Kramer, 1971; Hibbs et al. , 1981) . Time 
series regressions of presidential popularity and aggregate electoral 
returns on various macroeconomic variables have attempted to assess 
the relative weight voters place on unemployment, inflation, and real 
income growth. Again there is good reason to suspect that voters do 
not share common evaluations of the importance of each of these 
variables (Hibbs, 1979). 
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Issue voting (Pomper, 1975; Popkin et al. , 1976). Regressions of vote 
on party identification and ideology measures have been used to assess 
the importance and extent of "issue voting. " While there are many 
serious conceptual problems involved in this procedure, one that has 
been neglected is the "homogeneity assumption, " i. e. , that all voters 
put equal weight on the variables. This example is discussed below in 
Section 3. 
Two methods of coping with the heterogeneity problem have been 
employed in the past. The traditional approach in political science 
(as well as in market research) has been to ask individuals what is 
important to them (Repass, 1971; Rabinowitz et al. , 1982). 
Unfortunately, people are notoriously bad reporters of their own 
decision processes. The Gallup poll, for example, periodically asks 
its respondents what they think is the most important problem facing 
the country. While this series fairly accurately mirrors what is in 
the newspapers at any time, it does not seem to be very closely 
related to the factors which influence individual voting (see Markus 
and Converse, 1979, p. 1065). The other approach to the heterogeneity 
problem is to estimate separate regressions for various groups in the 
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population (Hibbs et al. , 1981). The main drawback of this technique 
is that one must choose which groups will be allowed to take different 
coefficients and homogeneity is imposed within each group. What is 
needed then is an exploratory technique for analyzing heterogeneous 
decision rules that does not rely on individual reports of preference 
weights or arbitrary restrictions of parameters within some groups. 
With the usual type of preference data � where only an 
individual's most preferred alternative is reported �there is little 
hope of learning much about the structure of individual decision 
processes. However, in some cases a complete preference order is 
elicited from each individual. The technique proposed here exploits 
information about the nature of individual preferences that can be 
obtained from complete preference orders. For example, suppose each 
individual is asked to rank m alternatives, denoted e1, • • • , em. Then a 
complete preference order is a ranking: 
e. R. e. R . • • •  R. ej Jl i J2 i i m 
where the indices j1, • • • , jm are distinct with 1 ! jl ! m for 
l = 1, • • • , m  and Ri is a weak binary preference relation (i. e. , 
ej Ri ek if and only if voter i prefers ej to ek or is indifferent 
between them) . In most cases we do not have a complete preference 
order for each individual, but the individual's most preferred 
alternative, say e. , is elicited. Jl 
For ej to be the voter's most 1 
preferred alternative, it follows that: 
9. Ri 9L for L Jl 
1, • • •  , m  
which involves m - 1 preference comparisons (excluding the trivial 
relation 9. R. 9. ). For a complete preference order, transitivity 
Jl 1 Jl 
of the preference relation implies: 
9. R. 9. 
Jl 1 JL 
9. R. 9. 
J2 1 JL 
9j Ri 9j m-1 L 
for L = 2, • • •  , m
for L = 3, • • •  , m
for L = m 
or (m - l)m/2 nontrivial preference comparisons.1 If the number of 
alternatives J is moderately large, there is a great deal of 
information in a complete preference order that is lost if only an 
individual's most preferred alternative is elicited. In principle, 
this information can be used to study individual decision processes. 
An econometric specification that exploits this possibility is 
s 
developed in the next section. The last section presents an empirical 
application using data from the 1980 National Election Study. General 
characterizations of voters as either partisan or ideological are 
shown to be misleading and some doubt is cast on the meaning of the 
standard party identification item. 
2. THE ECONOMETRIC PROBLEM AND A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
If, as in common practice, heterogeneity is ignored, then 
parameter estimates based on data where the homogeneity assumption is 
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violated can be seriously misleading. Consider, for example, a linear 
regression2 with random coefficients: 
Yi = x�l\ + ei (i = 1, • • •  , n) (2.1) 
where E(ei(xi, pi) = O and the observations are assumed to be 
independent identically distributed. Then a regression of yi on xi 
will not, in general, identify E(Pi): 
so that: 
,.. n , _1 n 
P =< I x.x. ) I x.y. 1=1 1 1 1=1 1 1 
,.. -1 plim p = E(p1. ) + V(x.) Cov(x., p. ) n-?a> 1 1 1 
where V(") and Cov(") denote variance and covariance matrices, 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
respectively. Unless xi and pi are uncorrelated, the least squares 
estimator (2.2) will provide estimates of E(Pi> which depend on both 
the "corresponding" and "noncorresponding" microparameters. (The 
terminology is borrowed from Theil, 1954, pp. 13-14. ) For example, if 
the explanatory variables in (2.1) include party and ideology 
variables, the estimated party coefficient will depend not only on the 
individual party coefficients, but also on the individual ideology 
coefficients. In other words, the estimated coefficients do not even 
provide accurate estimates of the average individual effects, but 
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confound the effects of all the variables. 
Beyond possible coefficient biases that it might cause, 
heterogeneity itself might be of interest and it would be desirable to 
discover what structure � if any -- there is to the heterogeneity and 
how it influences model predictions. This possibility is particularly 
important in discrete choice situations where the response function is 
nonlinear. In political business cycle models, for instance, the 
support of voters with very low or high probabilities of favoring the 
incumbent will be difficult to capture or lose. If the policymaker 
faces some type of Phillips curve constraint, his optimal policy (from 
the standpoint of vote maximization) will depend on the relative 
elasticities of substitution between the control variables for the 
neutral voters (see Kernell and Hibbs, 1981) . In this case, it is the 
nature and extent of heterogeneous preferences that are of central 
interest, but previously there has been no satisfactory way of 
studying this phenomenon. 
Following McFadden (1974) , suppose that we have a random 
sample of n individual with measured attributes xi. Individuals are 
asked to rank m alternatives described by measured attributes ej. The 
utility of alternative j to individual i is given by: 
uij = VCxi,ej) + eij (i 1 • • . •  , n; j 1, . • .  , m) (2.4) 
where V(", ") is called the strict utility of an alternative and 
captures the effects of measured attributes of the decision maker and 
the alternative while unmeasured and possibly idiosyncratic elements 
of choice are captured by eij" Utilities uij are unobserved, but 
individuals may report a ranking ri = (r11, • • •  , rim) of alternatives 
reflecting declining perceived utility, i.e.: 
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ui 1 u. 1 ... 1 u. ril iri2 irim 
(i 1, • . •  , n) . (2.5) 
Here the indices ri1, • • •  ,rim are assumed to be distinct with 
1 � rij � m for i = 1, • • •  , n  and j = 1, • • •  , m. A convenient 
specification for the distribution of the errors, which we will adopt, 
is that the eij be independently and identically distributed type I 
extreme value random variables (see Johnson and Kotz, 1970, ch. 21; 
McFadden, 1978, proposes a generalized extreme value distribution of 
which this is a special case) . 
The framework outlined above can be applied in modelling 
electoral choice. In voting models, it is usually assumed that 
candidates compete in a multidimensional policy space X which is a 
compact subset of JRP. Each voter has an ideal point xi 8 X 
representing his or her most preferred policy. A platform ej e X is 
associated with each of the m candidates. In nonstochastic electoral 
models, the utility of a candidate with platform e to a voter with 
ideal point X is usually taken to be a quasi-concave function Of 9 
which is maximized at e = x. For empirical work, a specific 
functional form must be selected and an obvious choice (also used in 
some early theoretical work; see Davis and Hinich, 1966) is the 
quadratic form: 
uij (xi - Oj)'Ai(xi - Oj
) + Bij (i 
j 
1 • . • •  , n; 
1, • . •  , m) 
where Ai is a symmetric negative semi-definite matrix. 
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(2. 6) 
The specification (2. 6) differs from that used by Davis and 
Hinich (1966) in two respects. First, the addition of the 
unobservable stochastic term sij makes utilities stochastic and 
accommodates idiosyncracies of preference that are commonly observed 
in empirical work. The second difference between (2. 6) and the 
original Davis-Hinich setup, is that the matrix of preference weights 
Ai is allowed to vary between voters, while Davis and Hinich assumed 
that all voters share an identical matrix A of preference weights. 
Davis and Hinich (1966, pp. 178-179) commented: 
It should be pointed out that the matrix A • • • is not given a 
subscript. The reason for this omission is a rather strong 
assumption. Although the components of the vector xi can assume 
any values which the ith individual might desire, it is presumed 
that the tastes of the voters are such that the matrix A enters 
the loss function of each individual. The population of voters 
is assumed to have a certain "homogeneity." In other words, 
although voters desire differing values of the indices of policy, 
all voters assign the same relative "weight" (or "importance" to 
any given issue. This (admittedly unrealistic) presumption is 
made solely for the reason of analytical convenience. 
In later work by Davis and Hinich and others, the homogeneity 
assumption implied by a constant matrix of preference weights was 
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discarded, but it still appears occasionally (e.g., Kramer, 1977) . In 
empirical work, as stressed in the introductory section of this paper, 
a similar type of homogeneity assumption is almost always invoked. 
In a voting model with random utilities (2. 6) and extreme 
value errors, the candidate choice probabilities are given by the 
following result: 
Proposition 1: The probability a voter with ideal point xi and 
preference weights Ai most prefers candidate j among the candidates in 
some choice set B £ {1, • • •  , m} is given by: 
v.. v 
P(jlxi, Ai, B) = e 
1J (\ e ik 
k� 
(j s B) (2. 7) 
where Vik = (xi - Ok)'Ai(xi - Ok) is the strict utility of candidate k 
to voter i. 
Proof: See McFadden (1974, p. 111, lemma 1) . 
The multinomial logit model, which has been successfully 
employed for analyzing voting data, generates choice probabilities of 
the form (2. 7) . Since with the usual sort of voting data (where only 
an individual' s most preferred candidate is recorded) it is not 
possible to estimate individual preference weights, a homogeneity 
assumption is required. If, however, complete rank-order information 
is available, the following result allows estimation of individual 
preference weights: 
Proposition 2: Under the assumptions of Proposition l, the 
probability of an individual having a ranking (ri1, • • •  ,rim) of the 
candidates is given by: 
v. v. 
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Pr(u. 1 · · · 1 u. ) iril irim
m-1 
TT ce 
j=l 
i,ri. m i,r. k J/ [ e i ) (2.8) 
Proof: See appendix. 
k=J+l 
For estimation purposes, we form the log-likelihood function: 
log L CA1, • • •  ,An) 
n m-1 
I L cvi,r 
i=l J=l ij 
m vi,r 
- log ( [ e ik)) 
k=J+l 
which can be maximized by standard numerical algorithms. The 
(2.9) 
resulting estimates will be called COLOGIT (Completely Ordered Logit) 
estimates. 
Two limitations of the COLOGIT procedure should be mentioned, 
one statistical and the other conceptual. An undesirable feature of 
choice probabilities of the form (2.7) is the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This property, also known in the 
psychological literature as Luce' s choice axiom, requires that the 
odds of picking one candidate over another not depend on the presence 
of other candidates in the available choice set: 
P Cilxi,Ai' (i,j}) 
P (jlxi,Ai,(i,j})
P (ilxi,Ai,B) 
P (jlxi,Ai,B) 
(2 .10) 
where (i,j} £ B. If the other alternatives are really irrelevant, 
then (2.10) poses no real problem, but if the other alternatives have 
similar unobserved attributes (e.g., Esij eik � O), then IIA implies 
implausible preference patterns. For example, suppose initially the 
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choice-set includes candidate 1 (a liberal), candidate 2 (a moderate), 
and candidate 3 (a conservative) and voter i is indifferent between 
the alternatives: 
P (llxi,Ai,{1,2,3}) = P C2lxi,Ai,{1,2,3}) 
= P C3lxi,Ai,(1,2,3}) 
(2.11) 
1/3 
Now suppose the field of candidates is enlarged to include two more 
conservatives (candidates 4 and 5) whose measured characteristics are 
identical to candidate 3.3 It seems plausible that the conservative 
candidates (3,4, and 5) might split candidate 3's vote in the three-
way race and, in particular, that the probability of voter i choosing 
candidate 1 or 2 should be unaffected. Unfortunately, from (2.7) it 
is clear that the present model would predict: 
P Cllxi,Ai,(1,2,3,4,5}) = P C2lxi,Ai,{1,2,3,4,5}) = P C3lxi,Ai,(1,2,3,4,5}) 
= P C4lxi,Ai,{1,2,3,4,5}) = P C5lxi,Ai,(1,2,3,4,5}) 
Some specifications that permit departures from IIA have been proposed 
(McFadden, 1978; Hausman and Wise, 1978; Tversky, 1972; Small, 1981), 
but these require further parameterizations of the model which are 
unworkable in this context. In defense of the present specification, 
it requires no additional assumptions other than those used in all 
extent legit analyses of candidate preference, while it does dispense 
with the crucial homogeneity assumption. 
(2.12) 
1/5 
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The main statistical limitation of the COLOGIT procedure is 
that with a fixed number m of candidates to be ranked, maximization of 
the likelihood function (2.9) does not yield consistent estimates of 
the Ai matrices since the number of parameters is increasing with 
sample size n. This, however, is not a serious deficiency since we 
are not generally interested in the parameters for a specific 
individual. The following theorem states that the COLOGIT estimates 
can be used to consistently estimate the average parameter for a group 
as the group's size increases. Alternatively, regressions of the 
parameter estimates on any set of exogenous variables will be 
consistent (subject to standard regularity conditions). Let 
ei = vechAi denote the free parameters in Ai. 
Proposition 3: Suppose e. e &, a compact convex subset of lllq with J. 
the true value of ei, denoted e�. an interior point of & for 
i = 1, • • •  ,n. Let: 
!i(fli) 
m-1 
= 
J�l 
v. 1 i,rij 
- og 
m 
(
�1 
vi,rik e ) 
denote the log likelihood of the ith observation and assume: 
(2.13) 
(i) * * E(a!i(ei>/aei) = o and vca!i(ei>/aei) is uniformly bounded 
(ii) 
Then 
for i = 1, • • •  ,n. 
a2Li(e)/aeiae� is positive definite for each e e & for each 
i and is uniformly bounded by a constant M. 
n ,. *· 1 I ce. - e 1 > � o almost surely. n i=l J. 
Proof: See appendix. 
The theorem shows that the average COLOGIT estimates are 
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strongly consistent estimates of the average group parameters as group 
size increases. Assumption (i) above requires that the choice 
probabilities (2.7) be correctly specified while assumption (ii) is a 
regularity condition that is satisfied if the xi are bounded (e.g., 
xi e Xis sufficient). These assumptions can be weakened somewhat 
further, but do not seem unduly stringent for the proposed 
applications. 
3. APPLICATION TO ISSUE VOTING 
The debate over issue voting has been a contentious affair 
with emotionally charged exchanges between, on one side, those who 
doubt voters' "competence" to make informed policy choices and, on the 
other side, those who find voters "surprisingly sophisticated." The 
argument has centered upon the relative importance of voters' policy 
preferences and partisanship on their voting decisions. The following 
analysis by Nie et al. (1979, p. 166) is not atypical and if anything, 
a good deal more careful in its choice of language and drawing of 
conclusions than the average paper on issue voting: 
The contrast between the attitude/vote correlations and the 
party/vote correlations is dramatic. The relationship between 
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issues and the voting decision rises sharply. In 1956, the 
correlation between issue positions and the vote was 0.18. The 
correlation goes up dramatically in 1964 and remains 
substantially above the earlier years. In the pre-1964 period a 
citizen' s position on the issues, as measured by our summary 
attitude scale, bad little or no impact on the way in which be 
voted. Citizens on the left side of the scale were almost as 
likely to vote for a Republican as for a Democrat. Citizens on 
the right were almost as likely to vote Democratic as Republican. 
There was a small increase in the relationship between issue 
position and the vote in 1960, but the major shift seems to have 
come between 1960 and 1964. From 1964 on, there is a 
considerable association between left-right issue position and 
direction of the presidential vote • •  The data suggest that 
the American public bas been entering the electoral arena since 
1964 with quite a different mental set than was the case in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. They have become more concerned with 
issues and less tied to their parties. 
While the present paper offers no evidence to contradict these 
conclusions, it is doubtful that correlations between voting and party 
identification can support such sweeping generalizations about "the 
American public." As Nie et al. (1979, pp. 227-229) and others have 
pointed out, blacks as a group have resisted the aggregate trend 
toward increasing independence. Is it safe to assume the rest of the 
population has behaved homogeneously? 
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That not all voters view politics in the same terms bas long 
been a staple of public opinion research. The American Voter 
classified people into categories based on whether they mentioned 
abstract ideological criteria, group benefits, or just the "nature of 
the times" in evaluating parties and candidates (Campbell et al., 
1960, chap. 9). Certainly few analyses of public opinion have been as 
influential in spawning further research. But, in another sense, this 
message of The American Voter seems to have bad almost no impact at 
all since the heterogeneity of voter decision processes has been 
ignored in almost all subsequent analyses of issue voting. 
One surmises that the neglect of heterogeneity in voting 
research stems from data analysts' inability to handle the problem. 
The COLOGIT procedure described in Section 2 provides a feasible way 
for exploring the heterogeneity problem with standard survey data. 
The National Election Studies do not ask respondents to rank order a 
set of candidates, but a rank order can be constructed from the 
candidate thermometer scores. The most severe practical problem with 
constructing a rank order in this way is the tendency of respondents 
to place candidates about whom they have no information at 500 (the 
midpoint of the thermometer scale) despite the presence of a filter 
question designed to eliminate evaluations of candidates the 
respondent doesn't know much about. (If a respondent cannot evaluate 
a candidate, that candidate is just removed from the individual' s 
choice set but remains in the choice set of other voters.) Note that 
the COLOGIT procedure uses only the ordinal properties of the 
thermometer item. 
The measured attributes of voters and candidates consist of 
placement on a three category party identification scale and a seven 
point left/right scale. All data are from the pre-election 
(September) wave of the 1980 National Election Study. Voters are 
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classified as Democrats (scored +1), Republicans (-1), or independents 
(0) based on responses to the first part of the standard party 
identification item: 
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a 
Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what? 
The scoring is, of necessity, somewhat arbitrary with no party 
preference or minor party preference counted as independent. The 
second half of the party identification item is not used since 
selection of the "leaning independent" and "weak partisan" categories 
appears quite sensitive to current candidate preference (Brody, 1977; 
Petrocik, 1974). If stronger partisans are in fact more partisan in 
their behavior, this should be reflected in a larger coefficient for 
the party term in those voters' strict utility function. The 
classification of candidates by party is straightforward except for 
John Anderson who was classified as an independent because at the time 
of the survey he was conducting a well publicized independent 
candidacy for the presidency. 
Voters are placed on a left/right scale based on their 
responses to the following question: 
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We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and 
conservatives. Here is a seven point scale on which the political 
views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal 
to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on 
this scale, or haven' t you thought much about this? 
Responses were scored from -3 for extremely conservative to +3 for 
extremely liberal. Voters were also asked to place candidates on this 
scale. The mean candidate placements, reported in Table 1, were used 
to locate the candidates. The mean candidate placement was used in 
place of the individual' s placement of the candidates in the hope of 
avoiding the rationalization problem identified by Brody and Page 
(1972). 
[Table 1 about here] 
In the present case, the specification (2.6) of voters' 
utility function reduces to: 
2 2 uij = ali(xli - 61j> 
+ a2i(x2i - 62j> + 8ij
where we have assumed that Ai is diagonal and: 
x1i = self placement of voter i on left/right scale 
x2i = party identification of voter i 
0lj = placement of candidate j on left/right scale 
02j = party of candidate j 
(3.1) 
Due to computational costs, a 15 percent subsample of 238 persons was 
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randomly selected from the 1980 NES survey. Respondents who were not 
interviewed in the pre-election wave, who declined to place themselves 
on the left-right scale, or who were unable to rank at least five 
candidates were deleted from the sample. In addition the numerical 
algorithm used to compute the COLOGIT estimates failed to converge to 
a solution in 6 cases. After these deletions, 122 cases were left for 
analysis. 
Is heterogeneity a problem in the NES data? Table 2 compares 
the standard multinomial logit estimates of (3.1) which impose the 
homogeneity assumption of equal party and ideology weights for each 
voter with the average COLOGIT estimates. The discrepancies between 
the MNL and average COLOGIT estimates are striking. The average party 
weight estimated by the COLOGIT procedure is more than twice as large 
as the MNL estimate while the average ideology weight is 50 percent 
less than the MNL estimate. In neither case is the average COLOGIT 
estimate within two standard errors of the MNL estimates. 
[Table 2 about here] 
To obtain a better sense of the variety of voter decision 
rules found in the sample, consider table 3. Relatively few voters 
have large party and ideology weights. The predominant pattern is for 
a voter to weight one of the candidate characteristics--party or 
left/right placement--fairly heavily and apparently to ignore the 
other characteristic (with the estimated weight sometimes being 
perversely signed). A description of the "average" voter based on the 
MNL equation disguises population heterogeneity in much the same way 
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census averages describing the "average" family as having 2.5 children 
do: one has trouble finding an average family. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Even though the COLOGIT and MNL estimates provide rather 
different pictures of voter behavior, they do not differ significantly 
in their implications for a hypothetical election. Tables 3 and 4 
simulate the Democratic vote share based on which strategies are 
adopted by the Democratic and Republican candidates. In both the 
COLOGIT and MNL simulations, the optimal Democratic and Republican 
strategies are identical with the parties adopting middle-of-the road 
positions and the Democrats winning about 52 percent of the vote.4 
This estimate, which ignores all candidate characteristics except 
party and left/right placement is very similar to Converse's estimate 
of the "normal vote" (Converse, 1966, p. 27). Since 1964 no 
Democratic presidential nominee has attained the "normal vote" which 
may be explained in part by the nomination of left-of-center 
candidates by the Democrats. Note that a moderately conservative 
Republican Ce2 = 1) defeats a moderately liberal Democrat ce2 = -1) 
easily (53-47 approximately) and defeats a truly liberal Democrat 
ce2 = -2) in a landslide (61-39). While these simulations ignore 
other important factors, such as the performance of the incumbent and 
the personalities of the candidates, electoral outcomes do appear 
quite sensitive to the ideological strategies adopted by candidates. 
[Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
That, ideological factors can swing elections but not all 
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voters appear to evaluate candidates in terms of their left-right 
placement leads us to ask who are the ideological voters? More 
specifically, does partisanship as it is traditionally measured 
discriminate between voters who base their candidate preference more 
on the candidate's party affiliation than on his ideological 
placement. Table 6 provides a partial answer. Strong and weak 
partisans differ very little (if at all) in their distribution of 
ideology weights. A smaller fraction of independents have large 
ideology weights than either partisan group though a larger fraction 
of independents fall into the middle category of ideology weights 
� 
(-0. 2 � a1 < O) . Roughly the same fraction of each group (32 to 38 
percent) place essentially no weight on candidate left-right placement 
in reaching their candidate evaluations. In short, strength of 
partisanship does not seem to be very closely related to use of 
ideological criteria in evaluating candidates. If anything, the more 
highly ideological voters are to be found among the supposed partisans 
rather than the independents though these differences should not be 
exaggerated. 
[Table 6 about here] 
More surprising is the evidence in Table 7 that partisanship, 
as we usually measure it, does not accurately reflect the degree to 
which voters employ partisan criteria in evaluating candidates. 
Strong partisans are somewhat more likely to place greater weight on a 
candidate's partisan affiliation than weak partisans, but even many 
self-identified strong partisans place little or no weight on 
partisanship in evaluating candidates. Though the quadratic form of 
the specification (3.1) makes comparison of the independent and 
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partisan categories hazardous in this case, it is quite surprising to 
find over half of the supposed independents possessing large partisan 
weights. As evidence by their revealed preferences, the fact that 
someone declares himself or herself to be an "independent" or a "weak 
partisan" should not be interpreted to mean that that individual does 
not employ partisan criteria in evaluating candidates. 
To summarize the empirical results in this section, 
heterogeneity does appear to be present in a simple issue-voting 
model. Moreover, the failure of the homogeneity assumption does bias 
one's estimate of the "average" decision rule as indicated by the 
departure of the average COLOGIT estimates from the MNL estimates. 
Finally, the relationship between self-reported partisanship and 
estimated party weights illustrates the unreliability of self-
classification as a method of identifying heterogeneity and may 
explain the limited success of weighing respondent's policy 
preferences by their own assessments of the policy' s importance.5 
4. CONCLUSIONS
Heterogeneous preferences complicate analyses of voting and 
other types of individual choice behavior because when models of the 
"average" decisionmaker are applied to heterogeneous populations, 
estimates requiring a homogeneity assumption will not, in general, 
accurately describe "average" behavior. How serious a problem 
heterogeneity poses depends, of course, on the purposes of the 
particular analysis in question. For example, if one's interest in 
analyzing issue voting is to determine whether candidate strategies 
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are (or should be) sensitive to changes in voters' issue preferences, 
then standard estimation techniques (such as MNL) appear satisfactory 
since their predictions do not differ substantially from those of the 
COLOGIT procedure. If, however, one's interest is the psychology of 
voting then the results of this paper should be quite unsettling. As 
shown in Section 3, standard estimates of an issue voting model 
provide a very misleading picture of voter decisiomnaking since, when 
heterogeneity is taken into account, few voters resemble the naveragen 
voter supposedly described by the MNL estimates. 
Recent efforts in voting research, best exemplified by the 
important paper of Markus and Converse (1979) and the influential book 
of Fiorina (1981) , have attempted to capture the complexity of voter 
decisiomnaking. The present paper suggests that perhaps we have 
placed too much emphasis on developing complex models and ignored the 
diversity of voting behavior. Recognition of such diversity has 
sometimes been used as an excuse for avoiding systematic analysis of 
political behavior and, on occasion, even used to argue that such 
analysis is impossible. The methods described here allow one to 
explore the structure of heterogeneous preferences with a minimum of 
additional assumptions than are required for standard techniques. 
APPENDIX 
Lemma: Pr(Uij ! �IUij 1 Uik for all k s B) 
v. k tiB = log(k
�e 1) and j s B c {1, • • •  ,m}. 
-(�-tiB) 
= exp [-e ] where 
Proof: First, using (2. 4) and Proposition 1, observe that: 
Pr(Uij ! �IUij 1 Uik for all k B B) 
Pr(sij ! � - Vii and Bik ! Bii + Vii - Vik for all k B B) 
Pr(Uij 1 Uik for all k B B) 
-1 
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[ [ :�,,, l �-v. . c J 1J _ - e+Vij -vik> { 11 exp [-e ]} exp [-e-8 - s]ds ksB -co ksB\{j} 
Making the change of variables u = e-8 yields: 
Pr(Uij ! �IUij 1 Uik for all k B B) 
[ e
vik 
l<-1>R 
v . .
e 1J 
J"' vik-v 
.. 
exp(-u) e 1J )du 
vij k'iB e -� 
viF� � vik-vij -c�-tiB> exp [-e e ] = exp [-e ] 
KB 
Cl. E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Without loss of generality (reordering 
indices if necessary), suppose rij = m - j + 1 so 
uil ! ui2 ! ··· ! uim· First we show that: 
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Pr(uim ! tluil ! ... ! uim) = Pr(uim ! tluim l uik for k = 1, • • • , m) 
The proof is by induction on m. Using the notation of the preceding 
lemma, define Bj = {1, • • •  , j}. For m =  1, the result holds trivially. 
Since uim is independent of ui1, • . .  , ui, m-l' it follows from the 
induction hypothesis that: 
Pr(uim ! t and uim l uik for k =  1, • • •  , mluil ! · · ·  ! ui, m-l> 
-
t-Vim -(£+Vim-tiB ) f exp [-e m-1 exp [-e- 8 - e]de
-m 
Making the change of variable u = e-8 and noting the identity 
-(Vim-tiB ) 
1 + e m-1 = e 
simplifies the integral: 
tiB -Vim m 1/Pr(uim l uik for k =  1, • • • , m) 
Pr(uim ! t and uim l uik for k= 1, • • •  , mluil ! ··· ! ui, m-l> 
m 
= f exp{- [1 
-(t-V· ) 
e im 
+ e 
-t. ) -(vim iBm-1 ] u}du 
-(t-tiB ) m 
= exp [-e ] Pr(uim l uik for k = 1, • • •  , m) 
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This establishes that the probability of choosing one alternative from 
any choice set is independent of the ordering of less preferred 
alternatives in the set. Therefore: 
m-1 
Pr(u. l • • · 1 uir ) iril im 
TTPr(u. l u. for k =  j + 1, • • •  , m) 
j=l irij irik 
m-1 v.. m v . . 
TT Ce 1J I L e 1J) 
j=l k=J+l 
Q.E.D. 
� 
Proof of Proposition 3: From the first order conditions for 6i we 
obtain: 
ati � ati • o = ae:-<0i> = ae:-<0i> 1 1 
2 a Li - � + -�,c0i><0i -
a0ia0i 
• 
6i> 
� . where 6i is a point between 6i and 6i. 
Therefore: 
n "* I <�i - 6�> II 
i=l 
n 
111 I n i=l 
a2l. 
< --1- ce 
-1
a'i 
a0.a0' 
i> a0 c0�> 11
1 i i 
1 
by assumption (ii). 
by assumption (i): 
1 n ati • t. M lln: I ae:-<0i> II 
i=l 1 
at. 
Since a6: (6�) is independently distributed and, 
� vcaL.ce�>/ae.)/i2 < m .f:=.1 1 1 1 
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the desired result follows directly from the Kolmogorov strong law of 
large numbers (Rao, 1973. p. 114). 
Q.E.D. 
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FOOTNOTES 
* This research was supported in part by a grant from the National 
Science Foundation (SES 83-0994). 
1. With only a rank order but without the complete set of binary 
comparisons, transitivity is not testable. 
2. Similar results are worked out for limited dependent variable 
model by Rivers and Vuong (1983). In the linear case, the usual 
regression estimates can still be justified as the optimal linear 
predictors (see Rao, 1973, pp. 266-267). 
3. This example is a variant of the well-known red bus/blue bus 
problem. 
4. In the simulations, all positive coefficient estimates were set to
zero to preserve single-peakedness of individual utility 
functions. 
5. In a recent paper, Rabinowitz et al. (1982), using an analysis of 
covariance scheme, find somewhat stronger salience effects than 
earlier studies. The effects are still quite modest (the 
coefficient of the issue variable increases by roughly 35 percent 
if the issue is reported salient by the votes) so it is unclear 
what impact varying preference intensities might have on aggregate 
electoral outcomes. Markus and Converse (1979, p. 1065) claim, 
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citing some psychological literature, "that the choice of weights 
tends to make little difference in the ultimate predictions." 
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TABLE 1 
LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE CANDIDATE PLACEMENT 
Candidate 
Ted Kennedy 
Jerry Brown 
John Anderson 
Walter Mondale 
Jimmy Carter 
John Connally 
George Bush 
Ronald Reagan 
Mean 
-1.446 
-1.185 
-0.432 
-0.430 
-0.261 
TABLE 2 
0.486 
0.571 
1. 212
N 
892 
644 
748 
744 
925 
556 
744 
921 
RANDOM UTILITY FUNCTION ESTIMATES 
Coefficient 
al (Ideology) 
a2 (Party) 
N 
ln L 
MNLa 
-0.214) 
(0.051) 
-0.313 
(0.085) 
122 
-224.4 
COLOGITb 
-0.112 
(0. 774) 
-0. 730 
(2.995) 
122 
-1257 
a Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. 
b Mean and standard deviation of estimated 
coefficients. 
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TABLE 4 
TABLE 3 
JOINT DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY AND IDEOLOGY WEIGHTS 
ESTIMATED DEMOCRATIC VOTE SHARES (COLOGIT ESTIMATES) 
a2 ;;:; o -o.5 � a2 < o a2 < -o.5 
Liberal Republican Strategy Conservative 
Liberal I o.5271 I 0.3468 I o.3236 I o.3276 I 0.3403 I 0.3609 I 0.4266 
a1 ;;:; o 9.0% 8.2% 18.0% (11) (10) (22) 
-0.2 � a1 < o 2.5% 14.8% 8.2% (3) (18) (10) 
� I 0.6835 I 0.5271 I 0.3897 I 0.3723 I 0.3856 I 0.4392 I 0.4934 � 
w I 0.7063 I 0.6443 I 0.5271 I 0.4537 I 0.4654 I 0.5128 I 0.5643 � � 
� � I 0.1025 I 0.6609 I o.5914 I 0.5271 I 0.5405 I 0.5784 I 0.6278 � 
a1 < -0.2 18.9% 9.0% 11.5% (23) (11) (14) 
u I � � I o.6899 I 0.6515 I 0.5774 I 0.5133 I 0.5271 I 0.6021 I 0.6566 � 
� u I 0.6706 I 0.6068 I o.5198 I o.4598 I 0.4412 I 0.5271 I 0.6499 0 � w 
y = -0.32 N = 122 � I 0.6210 I 0.5316 I o.4607 I o.3990 I 0.3693 I 0.3818 I o.5271 
Conservative 
37 38 
TABLE 5 TABLE 6 
ESTIMATED DEMOCRATIC VOTE SHARES (MNL ESTIMATES) PARTISANSHIP AND ESTIMATED IDEOLOGY WEIGHTS 
Liberal Republican Strategy Conservative Independent Weak Strong 
Liberal I 0.5205 I 0.3112 I 0.2395 I 0.2421 I o.2805 I o.3424 I 0.4273 I 
>- I I a1 � o 36.7% 31.9% 38.5% oc I 0.7391 I 0.5205 I 0.3835 I 0.3496 I 0.3782 I 0.4415 I 0.5295 I ClJ 
.µ I I -0.2 � a1 < o 30.6% 23.4% 19. 2% ctt !-< I 0.8179 I 0.6629 I 0.5205 I 0.4600 I 0.4748 I o.5360 I 0.6263 I .µ 
00 I I a1 < -0.2 32.7% 44.7% 42.3% u I 0.8110 I 0.6962 I 0.5791 I 0.5205 I 0.5377 I 0.6054 I 0.1001 I --- --- --·.-! 
.µ I I 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% ctt 
!-< I 0.7593 I o.6534 I o.5479 I 0.4918 I o.5205 I 0.6140 I 0.1291 I (49) (47) (26) u
0 
i= I 0.6840 I 0.5719 I 0.4631 I 0.3942 I 0.4055 I 0.5205 I 0.6862 ClJ � I 
Conservative I 0.5884 I 0.4639 I 0.3529 I 0.2775 I 0.2575 I 0.3244 I 0.5205 
TABLE 7 
PARTISANSHIP AND ESTIMATED PARTY WEIGHTS 
Independent Weak Strong 
a2 � o 22.4% 36.2% 34.6% 
-o.5 � a2 < o 22.4% 44.7% 26 .9% 
a2 < -o.5 55.1% 19.1% 38.5% 
-- --- --
99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 
(49) (47) (26) 
